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Abstract: Marino & Merskin’s target article on the cognitive and psychological capacities of sheep
commendably aims to use science to critique human practice. However, the article fails to make
specific recommendations about how human-sheep relations should change going forward. We
also underscore two problematic assumptions highlighted by other commentators: (1) that
cognitive complexity is important to the case for the moral status of non-human animals and (2)
that the way humans use and treat animals is caused by our conception of animals’ capacities.
Scientists should engage more with philosophy and ethical theory to articulate the implications of
animal capacities for human treatment of animals.

Peter Woodford is an Assistant Professor at
Union College, Schenectady, NY. His research
focuses on the intersection of science and ethics,
the evolutionary foundations of ethical values,
scientific research on altruism and cooperation,
and the relationship between science and
religion. Website

Alecia Carter is a research scientist with the Centre
National de la Recherche Scientifique at
l’Université des Sciences de l’Évolution de
Montpellier. Her research investigates how animals
acquire and use information to make decisions.
Website

Marino & Merskin’s (M&M) (2019) article on the cognitive and psychological capacities of sheep
is a good illustration of an attempt to use science to critique ideology and human practice. If
ideology is a view of reality that supports and legitimizes a set of social practices, and indeed hides
aspects of reality from view that might challenge the moral acceptability of such practices, then
the notion that sheep are simple-minded, passive, obedient, and dependent — lower beings on
an ontological scala naturae — might be the ideology that allows those who mistreat sheep to
sleep at night. In that way, as M&M put it, (recent) historical perceptions of sheep may “fuel and
sustain contemporary media, popular culture, and farming practices” (p. 16).
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M&M hope that their review will lead to “reconsidering the use of sheep as commodities
in modern agricultural production and in invasive research” (p. 16). However, the nature of this
reconsideration is left largely vague; and M&M do not outline what an ethical relationship with
sheep concretely requires. To do so would require defending an ethical theory and showing how
it applies in this case, which would benefit from engagement with literature in the field of animal
ethics.
To illustrate this, we point out that M&M’s argument appears to be implicitly abolitionist;
that is, it supports the position that humans should “free” sheep and cease using them for
resources or for research. This abolitionist stance, however, does not obviously follow from the
facts about sheep psychology that M&M illuminate. Abolitionism is particularly problematic given
that domestic sheep exist because of human artificial selection. Horback (2019) illustrates an
alternative conclusion, namely, that sheep need human intervention because they are a
domesticated species: that it is arguably unethical to “re-wild” them and certainly unethical to
simply set them free when some breeds need human intervention. An abolitionist stance thus
requires much more argument and defense.
If M&M intended to defend a more moderate position — one that minimizes the infliction
of unjustifiable suffering on sentient beings — more could have been done in the review to define
what it means to mistreat sheep given what is known of sheep’s abilities. That is, what constitutes
minimal justifiable suffering? M&M do not take a clear stance on the more challenging moral
questions: Would it be morally permissible under certain levels of care and minimization of
suffering to use sheep for wool, milk, meat or scientific research? What extent of suffering might
be morally acceptable? How does our knowledge of sheep psychological complexity help us
determine the conditions under which sheep suffer in indefensible ways? The answers to these
questions are often difficult. There is room for reasonable disagreement, and the morally relevant
factors of specific cases require analysis. For example, there is no way to minimize suffering in
industrial farming where most attention is paid to minimizing cost and maximizing output. But in
a system where sheep that live their lives on small-scale farms where they are known individually
and habituated to being handled, one could argue that suffering is minimized enough for use of
their wool and milk. But what about the use for leather and meat?
M&M also claim that psychological complexity is the capacity upon which the moral status
of sheep rests. We would second Browning’s (2019) and Palmer & Sandøe’s (2019) point that
none of the leading theories in animal ethics rest their case on psychological complexity or
intelligence. To do so would be to endorse an anthropocentric picture that animal ethics as a field
has sought to discredit. Instead, the minimal capacity that matters to most ethicists is sentience,
defined as the ability to experience pleasure or pain, or as Regan (1983, p. 243) put it: having an
experiential life that can go well or badly.
As Vonk (2019) and Horback (2019) also point out, the focus on complexity is incoherent
given the critique of anthropocentrism M&M try to make: frustratingly, M&M allude to the
morally relevant capacities of sheep through comparisons to taxa that are putatively given higher
moral regard because of their intelligence, such as primates. But even if sheep were in fact
“simple” and obedient, this would in no way entail that it was permissible to harm them, just as
the varying mental capacities of other human beings have no relevance for whether we are
morally obligated not to harm them (Singer, 2015). This is a crucial point in the case for the moral
status of animals.
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Another questionable assumption is one that is widely made in areas of environmental
ethics and animal ethics, and has been made by several other commentators on this target article
(Baker, 2019; Davis, 2019; Palmer & Sandøe, 2019). M&M claim that they are challenging a view
— that sheep are “less” than other animals — which allows people to “psychologically distance”
themselves from the animals they use for resources. If the source of cruelty to animals lies in the
false or even self-deceptive belief that humans have no moral obligations to animals or the rest
of nature because they are “lower,” then the solution to the problem lies in correcting this belief.
Whether humans are more likely to treat animals better if they come to reject the scala naturae,
however, is an empirical claim about human psychology and behavior that we cannot yet support
on the basis of evidence. Moreover, there are prima facie reasons to be skeptical:
Humans have strong material interests in the resources sheep offer. This is probably the
major reason they were domesticated in the first place — and the reason factory farming exists
today. Of course, having a strong material interest may also mean that there is a strong interest
in rejecting moral arguments and in “rationalizing” bad behavior. But humans are also cruel to
other humans, and there is a general problem that humans often fail to do what they consider to
be morally right. This is not at all to suggest that anthropocentrism is correct, or that challenging
it is not at least an important part of what it will take to bring human-animal relationships into an
ethically justifiable state. But M&M’s critique is not sensitive enough to the more complex
institutional, psychological, and economic factors that contribute to the use of animals for the
sake of humans. Seen in this light, the fact that sheep are viewed as “obedient, passive, and
uniform” may not play a decisive role in our best psychological explanation of why they are
mistreated.
To be clear, we agree that domesticated animals are treated abhorrently in mass farming
practices and in some areas of research, that this mistreatment arises in part through
psychological-cognitive mechanisms that will be difficult to overcome, and that much could be
done to improve domestic animals’ lives. However, M&M’s target article largely bypasses the hard
questions and misses an opportunity to specify more concretely what it means to mistreat sheep.
Drawing out the ethical implications of scientific work on animal cognition and psychology
requires deeper engagement with ethical theory.
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